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Like in the subchapters on Kosovo, 
the author outlines the political activity 
of the Turkish parties in Macedonia, as 
well as the Turkish community’s activi­
ties through numerous cultural and civic 
organisations. As already mentioned, the 
dispersion of the Turkish population is a 
limiting factor as regards their represen­
tation in the parliament and local coun­
cils, and impedes more ambitious politi­
cal engagement. Moreover, as is often the 
case, political, ideological and personal 
divisions within the Turkish political 
class further complicate political life. 
The main division is into adherents of a 
moderate liberal political stand and na­
tionalists who accept the Turkish­Islamic 
synthesis. 
The political situation in the self­
proclaimed Republic of Kosovo and in 
Macedonia remains problematic and 
volatile. Albanian­Serbian and Albanian­
Macedonian relations are always first to 
come to mind when trying to explain the 
complexities of the region’s recent history, 
and they certainly are key to understand­
ing its past and future. But Çelik offers 
the readers of his book a new perspective, 
that of the region’s Turkish minority. Al­
though the numerical strength and politi­
cal and cultural influence of the Turkish 
population is relatively weak, they form 
an integral part of these societies and are 
active participants in political events and 
developments in the central Balkans, es­
pecially given the support they enjoy from 
the Republic of Turkey.  
Kosta Nikolić, Mit o partizanSkoM jugoSlovenStvu [The Myth of Partisan 
Yugoslavism]. Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2015, xvii+502 p. 
Reviewed by Dragan Bakić*
Many generations of Yugoslavs born after 
1945 thought that their socialist homeland 
had been forged in the Second World War 
in the heroic armed struggle fought by Tito’s 
communist partisans against the occupiers 
and their collaborators (narodnooslobodilačka 
borba). It was then, as the communist origin 
myth expounded, that the nations and na­
tional minorities of Yugoslavia forged their 
brotherhood and unity (bratstvo i jedinstvo) 
which laid ground for the post­war socialist 
federation. That new country replaced the 
“rotten monarchist dictatorship” that was 
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia destroyed in the 
Axis invasion of 1941 and put an end to na­
tional discrimination of non­Serb peoples 
that was synonymous with the rule of a 
“Greater­Serbian hegemonic clique”. The 
legacy of communist Yugoslavism, however, 
seems to have survived the break­up of the 
country nearly twenty­five years ago. In 
Serbia, in particular, a section of population, 
not limited to youth­nostalgic older genera­
tion, still maintains a strange affection for 
dead and buried Yugoslavia. All this makes 
the necessity of scholarly examination of 
the phenomenon more pronounced. That 
is exactly what Kosta Nikolić, one of the 
most gifted Serbian historians, embarks on 
in his most recent monograph. His analy­
sis is a continuation of what he had already 
discussed in his excellent Srbija u Titovoj 
Jugoslaviji (1941–1980) [Serbia in Tito’s 
Yugoslavia] (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 
2011). Nikolić has presented a thorough 
deconstruction of what he terms “the myth 
of partisan Yugoslavism”. It should be noted 
that his study is not that of the history of 
the Yugoslav idea or the Yugoslav state from 
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1918 onwards. It focuses on the official dis­
course of Yugoslav communists and draws 
largely on the impressive range of sources of 
their own provenance and not that of their 
opponents. 
Nikolić analyses the communist view 
of Yugoslavism from the inception of the 
bolshevised Communist Party of Yugo­
slavia (CPY) at the Vukovar congress in 
1920. This included the struggle for prole­
tarian dictatorship and terror as means of 
achieving it and ensured that the CPY be­
came but a mere section of the Comintern 
whose policy it would blindly follow. It also 
meant that Lenin’s view of Yugoslavia as 
an artificial Versailles creation that needed 
to be broken became the guiding principle 
of CPY; the exploitation of the national 
question in this country became “the most 
efficient method” to accomplish its dis­
memberment and seize the power (p. 26). 
Rather than adhering to their internation­
al doctrine, the communists thus opted for 
“national communism” as the author aptly 
puts it. Based on Lenin’s interpretation 
that communists should support revolu­
tionary national liberation movements in 
“backward” countries, the “left faction” of 
CPY insisted on encouraging national dif­
ferences with the view to bringing down 
the Kingdom. Those Serbian communist 
such as Sima Marković and Filip Filipović 
who believed that the national question 
was democratic and constitutional had to 
renounce their views and accept those of 
their Croat and Slovene party colleagues. 
The latter proclaimed Yugoslavia to be a 
“dungeon of nations”: the “ruling” Serbian 
nation – and not just a “Greater­Serbian 
bourgeois clique” – suppressed the other 
nations, Muslims, Croats, Slovenes and 
Macedonians, and the struggle for their 
national liberation was instrumental in the 
struggle against capitalism and imperial­
ism. Such attitude led to the CPY’s coop­
eration with nationalist and even terrorist 
organisations of all anti­Yugoslav shades, 
the Croatian Peasant Party, Ante Pavelić’s 
Ustashas, Montenegrin separatists, pro­
Bulgarian IMRO, the Albanian Kosovo 
Committee. Complying with Stalin’s turn 
“to the left” into world revolution to top­
ple European fascist regimes which were 
about to start a military crusade against 
the Soviet Union, the CPY codified its 
anti­Yugoslav orientation in the decisions 
of the 1928 Dresden congress.
As a corollary of this emphasis on a 
national­revolutionary agenda came the 
transformation of the CPY from a single 
working class party organisation into 
several national parties. Serbian com­
munists were completely marginalised in 
this ideological shift and their role was re­
duced to extending help to the struggle of 
communists from the “oppressed” nations 
for their national liberation. This process 
was rounded off with the elimination of 
the most prominent Serbian commu­
nist, at least partly independent­minded 
Marković; after that, the next generation 
of Serbian communists trained their rev­
olutionary consciousness “with no regard 
for national interests of their own people” 
which was “a unique phenomenon in the 
political history of the European twenti­
eth century” (pp. 144–145). The founding 
of the Communist Party of Croatia and 
the Communist Party of Slovenia in 1937 
was a concession to separatist tendencies 
of Croat and Slovene communists and 
prepared the ground for (con)federalisa­
tion of the Yugoslav party and later the 
communist Yugoslav state. This was the 
organisational structure of CPY that Tito 
sanctioned when he became its leader in 
1940 emerging from Stalinist purges.
The true role of Tito’s partisans dur­
ing the Second World War in establish­
ing their own brand of Yugoslavism is 
perhaps the most revealing part of the 
book. Far from the official narrative about 
the joint struggle of all Yugoslav nations 
and national minorities against the Axis 
invaders forging brotherhood and unity, 
the partisans were participants in, and 
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one of the initiators of, the horrible civil 
war fought along ethnic and ideological 
divides which claimed the lives of the 
majority of war casualties. Nikolić con­
vincingly argues his case in an analysis 
of partisan war effort in each of Yugosla­
via’s regions with their different national 
structures. After having abstained from 
fighting the occupiers as long as the 1939 
German­Soviet pact of non­aggression 
was in force, communists rose to arms at 
the Comintern’s order following Hitler’s 
attack on the USSR in June 1941. The in­
surrection was quickly quelled by German 
troops but not before the partisans initi­
ated a civil war in Serbia against another 
resistance movement, Draža Mihailović’s 
royalists. In doing so, Tito discarded the 
Comintern’s instruction that “class strug­
gle” was a second phase of revolution that 
should follow, and not precede, national­
liberation struggle in which communists 
needed to join forces with all anti­fascists. 
Tito and his Serbian partisans found ref­
uge in Montenegro and spread a civil war 
there, even crueller than that in Serbia. 
Their main enemies became not Ger­
man and Italian occupiers, but rather 
Mihailović’s chetniks labelled “Greater 
Serb nationalists” who acted as military 
forces of the Yugoslav government­in­ex­
ile in London. Nikolić demonstrates how 
the civil war in Montenegro was in fact 
“a war for identity because communists 
fought for Montenegrin and royalists for 
Serbian statehood” (p. 303). The rhetoric 
about fighting “the traitors” and “the fifth 
column” was conveniently employed to 
justify a ruthless struggle for power.
In June 1942, Tito’s partisans were ex­
pelled from Montenegro and they arrived 
in western Bosnia, the heart of the Nazi­
puppet Independent State of Croatia. 
Their ranks and files were recruited from 
the Krajina Serbs subjected to genocide by 
the Ustashas whereas the Croat masses – 
and Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegov­
ina – supported an independent Croatia, 
if not the Ustaha regime. In order to gain 
support of Croats and Muslims, Tito and 
the CPY revived the bogey of “Greater 
Serb chauvinism” and went as far as to in­
timidate them with the prospect of being 
slaughtered by Mihailović’s chetniks un­
less they joined the partisans. Even such 
tactics did not yield much result until the 
capitulation of Italy in September 1943. 
Party headquarters in Croatia as well as in 
Slovenia had an absolute autonomy in the 
conduct of military operations and acted 
without coordination with each other 
or Tito’s Supreme Command. In Janu­
ary 1943 when the survival of the main 
partisan forces in Bosnia was at stake, the 
commander of Croatian partisans, Ivan 
Rukavina, refused direct requests for as­
sistance; Tito himself never set foot in 
Croatia during the war (p. 459). He had 
no less trouble with the disobedient and 
particularistic Communist Party of Croa­
tia led by Andrija Hebrang which, in 
Tito’s words, leant towards Greater Croat 
nationalism and separatism. Thus, there 
was no overall Yugoslav strategy and it 
was not before mid­1943 that the CPY 
started to insist on Yugoslavism and Yu­
goslavia for the sole purpose of acquiring 
legitimacy among the Allied Powers.
Elsewhere was the same. In Slovenia, 
communists were practically independent 
of the CPY and promoted Slovenian na­
tional interests alone, including irreden­
tist claims at the expense of Italy – Yugo­
slavia was not even mentioned. The fact 
that Slovenian partisans did not carry 
out a single military action outside their 
province throughout the war speaks for 
itself. In Macedonia, Metodije Šatorov 
went as far as to attach Macedonian party 
committee to the Bulgarian communist 
party and he was expelled from the CPY 
in July 1941 because of his hostile atti­
tude towards Serbs (pp. 367–368). A rift 
between pro­Yugoslav and pro­Bulgarian 
Macedonians remained the main fea­
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ture of the partisan movement in that 
province.
It was in Bosnia that the partisan 
movement managed to take root and 
prepare the ground for taking power in 
the entire country. Brotherhood and unity 
policy was most successful in this ethni­
cally­mixed area as a strategy of defend­
ing those who struggled for their life and 
offering Yugoslav solidarity and common 
army as a solution – Muslims were al­
lowed to preserve their special identity 
among partisans and given the opportu­
nity to escape their share of responsibil­
ity for Ustasha atrocities. It was in Bosnia 
that the national policy of CPY was fi­
nally shaped and formulated. This was a 
balancing act: Tito embraced the restora­
tion of Yugoslavia unpopular with non­
Serbs, but inevitable in order to maintain 
his movement which mostly consisted of 
Serbs; on the other hand, he underscored 
the full national self­determination that 
non­Serbs would have in a new Yu­
goslavia and passed over in silence the 
genocide committed against Serbs. Fi­
nally, the foundations of communist Yu­
goslavia were laid at the second meeting 
of the partisan supreme governing body, 
AVNOJ. It was then envisaged that fed­
eral Yugoslavia would consist of six units 
(republics): Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH), Serbia, Montenegro 
and Macedonia – BiH was the only one 
that was not based on national principle 
as it had no absolute ethnic majority 
among local Serbs, Croats and Muslims.
Serbia was a clear loser in the new 
communist re­composition of Yugosla­
via although Serbian communists alone 
called their compatriots for the restora­
tion of that country. Nevertheless, Tito 
and his Supreme Command maintained 
firm control over Serbian communists, 
the treatment of whom was sometimes 
humiliating. The formation of Serbia as 
a future federal unit bore witness to the 
utter inability and unwillingness of Ser­
bian communists to protect Serbian na­
tional interests. The Sandžak area nearly 
became a separate entity outside Serbia; 
it was because of the unwillingness of 
local Muslims to join partisans and the 
formation of two other autonomous re­
gions within Serbia that such designs 
were dropped. Vojvodina and Kosovo and 
Metohija were these autonomous regions 
– the latter despite the fact that the local 
Albanians supported the Axis occupation 
and offered armed resistance to partisans 
as late as December 1944 (the Serbs in 
Croatia did not receive autonomous sta­
tus although they were the backbone of 
partisan forces). This was effectively a 
concession to Albanian nationalism and 
an attempt to placate it, a policy that 
would carry on in post­war Yugoslavia. In 
fact, during the war Tito even considered 
ceding Kosovo to communist Albania. 
It was a measure of Serbian commu­
nists’ impotence that their party was not 
formed until May 1945, at the end of the 
war and eight years after the formation 
of the parties of Slovene and Croat com­
munists. In addition, repression against all 
anti­communists was by far most ruthless 
in Serbia – this was a continuation of the 
struggle against “Greater Serbianism”, the 
most dangerous enemy of CPY since its 
inception.
In conclusion, Nikolić has produced 
an excellent book which presents a well­
documented account of the evolution 
and nature of partisan Yugoslavism. His 
findings will be quite surprising to many 
a reader but lucid and convincing never­
theless. Contrary to partisan mythology, 
Nikolić has proved, partisan Yugoslavism 
was a thin veil designed to cover rampant 
nationalism of Yugoslav communists, 
with the noted exception of those of Serb 
origin, and to provide a framework for 
dictatorial rule of Tito and CPY. As such, 
it planted the seeds of destruction of Yu­
goslavia in a civil war just a decade after 
Tito’s death. 
